We study the question of obtaining last-iterate convergence rates for no-regret learning algorithms in multi-player games. We show that the optimistic gradient (OG) algorithm with a constant step-size, which is no-regret, achieves a last-iterate rate of O(1/ T) with respect to the gap function in smooth monotone games. This result addresses a question of Mertikopoulos & Zhou (2018), who asked whether extra-gradient approaches (such as OG) can be applied to achieve improved guarantees in the multi-agent learning setting. The proof of our upper bound uses a new technique centered around an adaptive choice of potential function at each iteration. We also show that the O(1/ T) rate is tight for all p-SCLI algorithms, which includes OG as a special case.

This paper introduces the first formalization, implementation and quantitative evaluation of Feint in Multi-Player Games. Our work first formalizes Feint from the perspective of Multi-Player Games, in terms of the temporal, spatial, and their collective impacts. The formalization is built upon Non-transitive Active Markov Game Model, where Feint can have a considerable amount of impacts. Then, our work considers practical implementation details of Feint in Multi-Player Games, under the state-of-the-art progress of multi-agent modeling to date (namely Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning). Finally, our work quantitatively examines the effectiveness of our design, and the results show that our design of Feint can (1) greatly improve the reward gains from the game; (2) significantly improve the diversity of Multi-Player Games; and (3) only incur negligible overheads in terms of time consumption. We conclude that our design of Feint is effective and practical, to make Multi-Player Games more interesting.

Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the non-convexity, obtaining the existence condition of global NE is challenging, let alone designing theoretically guaranteed realization algorithms. This paper takes conjugate transformation to the formulation of non-convex multi-player games, and casts the complementary problem into a variational inequality (VI) problem with a continuous pseudo-gradient mapping. We then prove the existence condition of global NE: the solution to the VI problem satisfies a duality relation. Based on this VI formulation, we design a conjugate-based ordinary differential equation (ODE) to approach global NE, which is proved to have an exponential convergence rate. To make the dynamics more implementable, we further derive a discretized algorithm. We apply our algorithm to two typical scenarios: multi-player generalized monotone game and multi-player potential game. In the two settings, we prove that the step-size setting is required to be $\mathcal{O}(1/k)$ and $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt k)$ to yield the convergence rates of $\mathcal{O}(1/ k)$ and $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt k)$, respectively. Extensive experiments in robust neural network training and sensor localization are in full agreement with our theory.

In the context of multi-agent systems, the rational verification problem is concerned with checking which temporal logic properties will hold in a system when its constituent agents are assumed to behave rationally and strategically in pursuit of individual objectives. Typically, those objectives are expressed as temporal logic formulae which the relevant agent desires to see satisfied. Unfortunately, rational verification is computationally complex, and requires specialised techniques in order to obtain practically useable implementations. In this paper, we present such a technique. This technique relies on a reduction of the rational verification problem to the solution of a collection of parity games. Our approach has been implemented in the Equilibrium Verification Environment (EVE) system. The EVE system takes as input a model of a concurrent/multi-agent system represented using the Simple Reactive Modules Language (SRML), where agent goals are represented as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae, together with a claim about the equilibrium behaviour of the system, also expressed as an LTL formula. EVE can then check whether the LTL claim holds on some (or every) computation of the system that could arise through agents choosing Nash equilibrium strategies; it can also check whether a system has a Nash equilibrium, and synthesise individual strategies for players in the multi-player game. After presenting our basic framework, we describe our new technique and prove its correctness. We then describe our implementation in the EVE system, and present experimental results which show that EVE performs favourably in comparison to other existing tools that support rational verification.

This paper also summarizes the main strategies our players have developed in our This paper presents iNNK, a multiplayer drawing game where human playtesting. Certainly, a lot more effort is needed to empower citizens players team up against an NN. The players need to successfully to be more familiar with AI and to engage the technology communicate a secret code word to each other through drawings, critically. Through our game, we have seen evidence that playful without being deciphered by the NN. With this game, we aim experience can turn people from passive users into creative and reflective to foster a playful environment where players can, in a small way, thinkers, a crucial step towards a more mature relationship go from passive consumers of NN applications to creative thinkers with AI. and critical challengers.

Researchers have developed an artificial intelligence-enabled machine that can beat human players in a tricky online multiplayer game where player roles and motives are kept secret, says a study. It was presented at International Conference on Information Systems. The machine, called'DeepRole', is the first gaming bot that can win online multiplayer games in which the participants' team allegiances are initially unclear, according the study from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), US. The bot is designed with novel "deductive reasoning" added into an AI algorithm commonly used for playing poker. This helps it reason about partially observable actions, to determine the probability that a given player is a teammate or opponent.

The biggest deal in the poker calendar kicks off tomorrow, but only humans will be allowed to sit in on the final table of the World Series of Poker's main event. This Las Vegas knock-out tournament whittled 7,319 entrants down to nine back in July, and after a four-month wait to build media interest in the mainly no-name internet-honed players, this merry band can now get down to playing for the $8.9m (£5.5m) top prize. But has poker bot development reached a level where a bot could be in with a shout for this prize? The short answer is not yet, unless it got lucky. In the short term, luck can override skill, but over time a good player will take a lesser opponent to the cleaners.)

There are two basic approaches to generalize the propagation mechanism of the two-player Minimax search algorithm to multi-player (3 or more) games: the MaxN algorithm and the Paranoid algorithm. The main shortcoming of these approaches is that their strategy is fixed. In this paper we suggest a new approach (called MP-Mix) that dynamically changes the propagation strategy based on the players' relative strengths between MaxN, Paranoid and a newly presented  offensive strategy. In addition, we introduce the Opponent Impact factor for multi-player games, which measures the players' ability to impact their opponents' score, and show its relation to the relative performance of our new MP-Mix strategy. Experimental results show that MP-Mix outperforms all other approaches under most circumstances.